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Abstract
Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions have been suspected of being inef-
cient by many empirical studies, but they are plagued by endogeneity problems. To
solve the problems, this paper identies a system that depicts interactions between the
interventions and the foreign exchange rate. The model shows that the interventions
are e¤ective when the interventions alter the market participantsconditional expec-
tations of the rate without decreasing the conditional variances. This paper estimates
Markov-switching type policy reaction functions by conditional MLE, and market de-
mand/supply curves by IV estimation with generated regressors. The empirical results
verify that the interventions of the Bank of Korea from 2001 to 2002 were indeed ef-
fective.
Keywords: Sterilized intervention; Endogeneity; Markov-switching policy function
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The e¤ectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions has been one of the intensively
discussed topics in central bank policy analysis. After myriads of papers have investigated
the topic, a skeptical view that the sterilized interventions do not have meaningful impacts
on the nominal exchange rate has prevailed. (Craig and Humpage(2001)) At best, the results
are mixed in general.1 However, it is still true that the debate is not closed yet, because the
literatures are plagued by endogeneity problems. Through the identication of the system
and valid instrumental variables(IVs), this paper estimated the e¤ect with minimizing the
endogeneity bias described as follows.
The rst endogeneity problem comes from the simultaneity between the intervention
decision and the contemporary exchange rate. That is, the intervention may have changed
the current spot rate, but it may also be true that the current spot rate movement leads to
the intervention. If we regress the rate movements on interventions with a single equation
such as
St = 0 + 1INTt + 2Xt + "t (1)
where St is a di¤erence in the exchange rate, INTt is the central bank intervention, and
Xt is other explanatory variables, this well known problem makes INTt endogenous, thus
we will have an inconsistent estimator for 1. (Neely(2005), Kearns and Rigobon(2005))
Endogeneity also comes from omitted variables in equation (1). To be clearer on this
point, lets assume that the interventions are decided regardless of the current spot rate.
Although INTt is exogenous now, it is still debatable whether Xt catches all the other
factors to be controlled other than interventions: if Xt fails to include variables which have
an explanatory power on St, 1 will be inconsistent again. Of course, most empirical
research has the omitted variables problem more or less, but unfortunately, it is particularly
di¢ cult to nd a valid Xt for the daily nominal exchange rate model. Existing papers have
tried news and(or) day of the week dummy variables, and Macroeconomic variables such as
the interest rate spread as Xt2. However, in many cases they are not statistically signicant.
1See the literature review of Galati et al., 2005
2Bonser-Neal and Tanner(1996) used macroeconomic news announcement dummy variables and sur-
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Messe and Rogo¤ (1983) have showed that macroeconomic models under-performed a simple
random work model in monthly out-of-sample prediction. Moreover, we focus on the daily
horizon in which it is believed that macro variables are less relevant with the exchange rate
than the longer horizon.
How can we avoid the endogeneity problems? For the simultaneous bias, we will have to
take into account an intervention reaction function such as
INTt = 0 + 1St +2Yt + ut (2)
where Yt is other factors that explain intervention decisions. (Neely(2005)) Now we have a
system of equations to be estimated, thus valid instrumental variables are needed to estimate
the system of equations. However, similar to the di¢ culties in nding a relevant Xt, a
lack of valid IVs now can be problematic.3 In this paper, customer tradeswere used as
IVs and the empirical results veried that they were valid. In addition, customer trades
data were shown to be closely related with the spot rate movements, thus they were used
for resolving the omitted variable bias. That is, the equation (1) was split into market
demand/supply equations, and then customer demand (supply) trades data were used for
identifying supply (demand) curve. Besides, the mechanism that the interventions may a¤ect
the rate became more transparent by specifying the demand and supply curves. In specic, if
the interventions shift the demand/supply curves to the desired directions without attening
the curves, leaning against windsoperations will be e¤ective.
The estimation strategy is as follows. First, Markov-switching type policy reaction func-
tions were estimated by the Conditional Maximum Likelihood method. Both the regimes
and latent variables were modeled as functions ofSt, therefore they were endogenous. Then
the market demand/supply curves were estimated by Instrumental Variables method with
prise component of the announced variables; Dominguez(1993, 1998) took the interest rate spread and day
dummy variables; Galati et al.(2005) used macroeconomic announcements; Ito(2002) included only FED in-
terventions; Rogers and Siklos(2003) used macroeconomic variables such as changes in stock market prices,
interest rate spreads, and relevant news dummy variables. (Bonser-Near and Tanner(1996), and Rogers and
Siklos(2003) regressed implied volatility on explanatory variables, rather than spot rate movement.)
3Kearns and Rigobon(2005) identied the system with the intervention regime change of Reserve Bank
of Australia and the Bank of Japan using simulation method.
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generated regressors from the reaction functions. Finally, the hypothetical exchange rate
was calculated to show what would have been the rate if there were no interventions. The
empirical results showed that the Bank of Korea intervened when the Korean won market
was volatile, and the operations decreased the volatility. Besides, this model was shown to
out-perform the random walk model in one-step-ahead prediction. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the Korean foreign exchange market and
the data set, and part 3 illustrates the system that species the interactions between inter-
ventions, market participantsbehavior, and the exchange rate. Part 4 shows the empirical
results, and the conclusion follows.
2 Facts and Data
As a sample, this paper covers the daily data from 2001 to 2002. In the sample period, the
Bank of Korea allowed the Korean won to uctuate freely according to demand and supply
conditions in the foreign exchange market.But it intervened to avoid abrupt uctuations of
the exchange rate within a short-term period.(The Bank of Korea(2002, 2003)) In addition,
the objective is to mitigate short-term exchange rate volatility, . . . rather than to maintain
a certain exchange rate target,most of the intervention transactions occurs in the spot
market, and its impacts on money supply are sterilized. (Rhee and Lee(2005)) In this sense,
I focused on the e¤ects of sterilized interventions on the foreign exchange rate volatility in
the Korean won spot market. For the intervention data, I used the daily change in foreign
exchange position of the Bank of Korea as a proxy, since the Bank of Korea kept the data
condential.
Because the Korean won is not internationalized yet, it is traded only in the Korean
foreign exchange market. In specic, the Korean won spot rate is determined in the Korean
inter-bank market which has a limit order book. That is, the market participantslimit
orders to buy (or sell) at certain prices meet each other electronically without dealers. The
market participants are mainly commercial banks chartered by the government, thus other
entities that want to transact the Korean won spot trade with participant banks. I refer to
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these entities as customers.
The customers include a wide range of entities. For example, there are enterprises sell-
ing USD (export companies) or selling the Korean won (import companies); individuals
who exchange the Korean won to USD at bankswindow; foreign investors who need to
trade USD/KRW spot to nance their investments on Korean securities; and other trading
desks within the banks such as non-deliverable forwards (NDF) desks whose positions are
frequently hedged by spot transactions. The data for demand and supply trades from the
customers were accumulated in daily frequency by surveying the participant banks.
3 The model
To specify the channel through which interventions a¤ect the exchange rate, a model for
the rate determination should be set up. Various models have been proposed for the rate
determination. However, regardless of whether they are ad hoc macroeconomic models or new
open macroeconomics models based on agentsoptimization problems, no model succeeded
in acquiring a unanimous approval so far. (Sarno and Taylor(2002)) Moreover, when it comes
to daily data, there is more skepticism about such models.
Thus, rather than specifying underlying macroeconomic theory, I focus on the fact that
the rate is determined in the inter-bank market. That is, whatever it is, a macroeconomic
variable a¤ects the rate only via the market participantsbehaviors. In this sense, if we
can identify the demand and the supply curves, we will be able to predict the rate validly,
thus correctly analyze policy issues such as e¢ cacy of interventions. Specically, similar to
the market microstructure approach to the exchange rate that takes order owsseriously,
(Lyons(2001)) I assumed that the daily ow of the demand and the supply will determine
the days rate change, not the stock of the demand and the supply at the end of the day.
One of the advantages of identifying the curves is that this model allows the interventions
to change not only the value of variables that the market participants take into account, but
also the structural parameters which depict the participantsbehavior.
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3.1 The behavior of market participants
Assume that the inter-bank foreign exchange market consists of two representative decision
making agents: a demander, and a supplier. The demander receives CDt(customer demand
for USD plus dollar buying interventions) from its customers including the central bank and
the supplier receives CSt(customer supply for USD plus dollar selling interventions) at day
t. However, they are assumed to have no information on the magnitude of interventions.
That is, the demander (supplier) only knows the aggregate magnitude of customer demand
(supply). But the presence of the central bank in the market is assumed to be known to
both parties. By denoting 
Dt(
St) as an information set for the demander (supplier) at
day t, assumptions on information are summarized as follows.
Assumptions on information
CDt 2 
Dt; CSt 2 
St; CDt =2 
St; CSt =2 
Dt
BUYt; SELLt =2 
St [ 
Dt; IfBUYt 6=0g 2 
St \ 
Dt; IfSELLt 6=0g 2 
St \ 
Dt
BUYt: USD buying intervention, SELLt: USD selling intervention,
Ifg: Indicator function
Given the customer demand (supply) ows, coupled with their own speculative views,
they form a daily demand (supply) schedule. To show this, lets suppose that the demander
and the supplier maximize the expected utility from a wealth dened as follows:
WDt  (St+1  St)QDt (3)
WSt  (St  St+1)QSt (4)
where WDt(WSt) is a wealth of demander (supplier), QDt(QSt) is a quantity demanded (sup-
plied), St is St   St 1, and St is the spot rate of Korean won against USD at day t.4
For tractability, assume that the expected utility functions of the demander and the sup-
plier are negative exponential functions with the absolute risk averse coe¢ cients, D and
4This denition of wealth is implicitly assuming that the demander and the supplier know that they will
switch their roles in near future, thus trade with each other at St at day t.
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S. Additionally, for a simple closed form objective function of the maximization problem,
assume St+1 follows normal distribution conditional on the information available to de-
mander (supplier). To show this normality, lets partition the time interval from t to t + 1
into N sub-intervals, t = k0 < k1 < k3 < ::: < kN = t+ 1, i.e. time index t is for day-by-day
index, and k is for tick-by-tick index. Thus, if the rate di¤erentials for small fraction of times
in day t + 1 are independent and identically distributed conditional on the information at
day t, by the Central Limit Theorem, we have
NX
n=1
Skn j 
Dt = St+1 j 
Dt  N(Dt; 2Dt) (5)
NX
n=1
Skn j 
St = St+1 j 
St  N(St; 2St) (6)
where D(S)t = E[St+1 j 
D(S)t], 2D(S)t = V ar[St+1 j 
D(S)t]. This generates the maxi-
mization problems for the demander and the supplier as follows:
max
QDt
fE[WDt j 
Dt]  D
2
V ar[WDt j 
Dt]g (7)
max
QSt
fE[WSt j 
St]  S
2
V ar[WSt j 
St]g. (8)
From the rst order conditions, we have the optimal choice of the demander and the supplier
as follows:
QDt =
E[St+1 j 
Dt] St
DV ar[St+1 j 
Dt]
(9)
QSt =
 E[St+1 j 
St] + St
SV ar[St+1 j 
St]
. (10)
Now the issue is how we can model the expected values and variances of the future
exchange rate di¤erentials which are conditional on the participantsinformation. The con-
ditional expected value of the demander (supplier) was modeled as a linear function of several
explanatory variables. First, the customer demand (supply) was included because it may
used as a daily proxy variable for macroeconomic fundamentals such as current account and
6
capital inow as described in part 2. Second, the lagged value of transaction volume was
included. The past volume is what was actually demanded (supplied) in the past, thus they
were assumed to capture the unknown factors that inuence the quantity demanded (sup-
plied) in an autoregressive way. For the last, the di¤erence of Japanese yen rate was included
to reect a speculative motive in Korean won market. As illustrated in gure 1, the Korean
won was synchronized with the Japanese yen for the sample period, and the movements of
the yen had a signicant impact on the sentiment of the Korean won traders in that period.
For conditional variance, I hypothesized that it remains constant for the sample period.
However, since market participants were assumed to know whether the central bank is inter-
vening or not, the conditional variance may be di¤erent between the days with and without
intervention. Whether there was di¤erence in the conditional variance will be tested. Under
these assumptions, the demand and the supply curve to be estimated is
Qt = D0 +
3X
k=1
DkQt k + D4CDt + D5CDt 1 + D6JPYt + D7St + "Dt (11)
Qt = S0 +
3X
k=1
SkQt k + S4CSt + S5CSt 1 + S6JPYt + S7St + "St (12)
where JPYt is the USD/JPY rate di¤erential, CD(S)t is decomposed into ~CD(S)t + BUYt
(SELLt) with ~CD(S)t as the customer demand (supply) ow without interventions and "s
are error terms.
In this simple mean-variance argument, the sterilized interventions matter in two ways.
First, they can a¤ect the conditional expectations. In this model, the central bank can
change CD(S)t to shift the demand (supply) curve, thus a¤ect the rate. I will denote this
e¤ect as a liquidity e¤ect. However, interventions can make behavioral parameters (s)
distinct across the days with and without intervention. For example, if the interventions
decrease uncertainty in future rate (V ar[St+1 j 
D(S)t]), jD7j and jS7j will increase and
the demand (supply) curve will be attened. This will decrease the impact of shifting the
curves.
7
3.2 Reaction function of central bank
As explained in part 2, the Bank of Korea is assumed to lean against winds in the sample
period. That is, it intervened when the rate abruptly moved, thus simple reaction functions
modeling this behavior are as follows.
BUY t = D0 + D1BUYt 1 + D2St + uDt (13)
SELLt = S0 + S1SELLt 1 + S2St + uSt (14)
where BUY t and SELL

t are latent intervention values, and us are error terms. However,
there are many clustered zeros in the intervention series, thus a threshold type model is more
plausible for the reaction function. That is, interventions should be expressed as
BUYt = dt BUY t (15)
SELLt = dt  SELLt (16)
where dt = 1 when there was an intervention and dt = 0 otherwise.
This reaction function postulates a two-step decision on the intervention. First, the
central bank decides whether it will intervene (dt = 1). Then, it will choose the magnitude
of the interventions (BUY t and SELL

t ). Therefore, dt is also a function of St. To model
this endogeneity in the intervention regime, a Markov-switching probability is dened as
follows:
pt  Pr(dt = 1 j dt 1 = 0; ~
t;St) = exp(0 + 1(jSt   S
trend
t j))
1 + exp(0 + 1(jSt   Strendt j))
(17)
qt  Pr(dt = 1 j dt 1 = 1; ~
t;St) = exp(2 + 3(jSt   S
trend
t j))
1 + exp(2 + 3(jSt   Strendt j))
(18)
where pt is the probability of switching from no intervention regimeto intervention regime,
qt is the probability of remaining in the intervention regime, ~
t is the information set of
the central bank and Strendt is a moving average trend of the rate. That is, according to this
reaction function, the central bank will intervene when the rate is deviated from the trend;
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and the amount of the intervention will depend on the previous days intervention and St.
To estimate the reaction functions, the conditional log likelihood functions are set up as
follows:
f(BUYt j ~
t) = f(dtBUY t j ~
t) (19)
= f(BUY t j dt = 1; ~
t) f(dt = 1 j ~
t);
f(SELLt j ~
t) = f(dtSELLt j ~
t) (20)
= f(SELLt j dt = 1; ~
t) f(dt = 1 j ~
t);
f(BUY t j dt = 1; ~
t) = f(BUY t j dt = 1; ~
t;St) f(St j dt = 1; ~
t);
f(SELLt j dt = 1; ~
t) = f(SELLt j dt = 1; ~
t;St) f(St j dt = 1; ~
t);
f(dt = 1 j ~
t) = fptIfdt 1=0g + qtIfdt 1=1gg  f(St j dt = 1; ~
t)
where BUY t j (dt = 1; ~
t;St)  N(D0 + D1BUYt 1 + D2St; 2D), SELLt j (dt =
1; ~
t;St)  N(S0+S1SELLt 1+S2St; 2S), and St j (dt = 1; ~
t)  N(0+1Qt 1+
2Qt 2+3Qt 3+4 ~CDt+5 ~CDt 1+6 ~CSt+7 ~CSt 1+8BUYt 1+9SELLt 1+10JPYt; 2Z).
Under these settings, the maximization problems are
max
BUY
TX
t=1
ln f(BUYt j ~
t); max
SELL
TX
t=1
ln f(SELLt j ~
t) (21)
where BUY = [D0; D1; D2; D; 0; 1; 3; 4; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; Z ] and
SELL = [S0; S1; S2; S; 0; 1; 3; 4; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; Z ].
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Estimation on coe¢ cients
Simple descriptive statistics for the variables were shown in Table 1. By the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, no variables were shown to have a unit root thus I could proceed with
the estimation. First, the intervention policy reaction functions were estimated with CMLE.
As in Table 2, most of parameters were signicant under 5% level. 1 and 3 were positive,
which means that the Bank of Korea actually decided to intervene when the smoothing
operations were needed. With the estimated parameters, the tted value of the interventions
was generated. The rule was,
if p^t < 0:5 and dt 1 = 0, then d^t = 0
p^t > 0:5 and dt 1 = 0, then d^t = 1
q^t < 0:5 and dt 1 = 1, then d^t = 0
q^t > 0:5 and dt 1 = 1, then d^t = 1
\BUYt = d^t\BUY t ; \SELLt = d^t \SELLt
where p^t and q^t are tted value of transition probabilities, d^t is the tted value of intervention
dummy variable and \BUYt(\SELLt) is tted value of buying (selling) interventions. For
simplicity, the threshold probability was arbitrarily set to 50%. In the tted values, the
number of the days of interventions decreases by 22.5%; 80.6% of the days with d^t = 1
coincide with the days with the actual interventions (dt = 1); and 88.7% of the days with
d^t = 0 coincide with the days without the actual interventions (dt = 0).
Next, the demand and the supply curves were estimated. Since I assumed that the market
participants only observed the aggregate value of customer trades and the interventions, new
explanatory variables were generated as follows:
CDt = ~CDt +\BUYt, CSt = ~CSt + \SELLt
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where ~CD(S)t is the customer trade without the interventions. To avoid the simultaneity bias
from St in the demand and the supply equations, this paper tried Generalized Method
of Moments for estimating coe¢ cients. I could identify the two equations because of the
assumption that the customer demand (supply) a¤ects the equilibrium rate, and it is only
through the demand (supply) behavior. Specically, the customer demand (supply) will be
a good instrumental variable for the supply (demand) curve. The estimation results were
summarized in Table 3 and 4. Pagan-Hall test statistics showed that the errors were ho-
moskedastic, thus simple IV estimation (2SLS) was applied. Except for the constant in
the supply curve, all the coe¢ cients were signicant under 10% signicance level.5 For
the validity of instrumental variables, Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio sta-
tistic rejected the null hypothesis that the IVs were weak in the both equations under 1%
signicance level, and Sargans statistic showed that the IVs were exogenous in the both
equations. Portmanteau Q statistic indicated that residuals were white noise with 1, 5 and
10 lags. These features show that the coe¢ cients are consistently estimated.
The signs of coe¢ cients correspond with intuitions. The demand (supply) curve was
downward (upward) sloping, and if the price of the USD denominated by the Japanese
yen (the USD/JPY rate) increased, the expected USD price denominated by the Korean
won, i.e. E[St+1 j 
D(S)t], also increased in both equations. The customer trades have a
positive relationship with the quantity demanded (supplied) in the same day, but a negative
relationship for the quantity in the day after.
The predictive power of the model is another issue. Figure 2 illustrates the in-sample
predicted value of the exchange rate which solves the estimated demand and supply curve.
For the out-of-sample prediction, I followed Messe and Rogo¤(1983)s arguments. That
is, the model was estimated with the rst 10 days, and then the one-day-after prediction
was made with the estimated coe¢ cients. By expanding the sample size by one day, this
procedure was repeated. Results in Table 5 show that this model has lower mean squared
errors and mean absolute errors in one-day-after prediction compared with a random walk
model.
5Since generated regressors were used, the standard errors should be corrected. I followed
Wooldridge(2002)s arguments. See page 139-141.
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What remains is to check whether the conditional variances were di¤erent between the
days with and without the interventions. The equation (9) and (10) shows that if they are
di¤erent, s should be di¤erent. Thus, Chow test was applied, and the result in Table 6
showed that we couldnt reject the null hypothesis that they were same. Therefore, I could
conclude that the intervention of the Bank of Korea made no distinction in the participants
behavioral parameters.
4.2 The hypothetical rate and the e¤ect of the intervention
What would have happened in the foreign exchange market if there were no interventions?
The answer can be tackled in two ways: the intervention may shift the demand and the
supply curves (liquidity e¤ect), and also may change the slopes of the curves. However, this
paper shows that the slopes were same across the days with and without intervention, thus
what remains is the liquidity e¤ect. Shifted curves were derived by replacing CD(S)t with
~CD(S)t and solving the simultaneous equations. In this way, the hypothetical rate which
assumes that there were no interventions is generated, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Since it was assumed that the Bank of Korea tried to minimize the abrupt change in the
rate, the sample variance of St can be a criterion for assessing the e¢ cacy of the operations.
Table 7 shows the nal results. The sample variance of St was 32.708, but in the hypotheti-
cal rate, it was 32.969 in the overall period, which means that the interventions decreased the
actual market volatility. More interestingly, this hypothesis rate argument can be used for
specifying the causal relationship between the volatile market and the interventions. That
is, in the hypothetical world, the sample variance of the St was 25.792 for the days without
interventions, but it was 55.717 when there were interventions. This means that the Bank
of Korea intervened because the market was volatile, but not the other way. Furthermore,
the sample variance of the actual rate di¤erentials in the days with intervention was 54.523,
which means that the interventions decreased the market volatility measured by the sample
variance of the rate di¤erentials.
This paper showed that there was no signicant di¤erence in the agentsbehaviors with
the interventions. Therefore, only the liquidity shock accounts for the e¤ectiveness of in-
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tervention. Leaning against winds operations are to supply the liquidity to the market in
the opposite direction of the rate movements, thus every leaning against winds operations
will always decrease the volatility if the market participants do not change their behavioral
pattern. In specic, if the market participants expect that the variance of St+1 will be
decreased with interventions of the day t, they will be more willing to change the quantity
demanded (supplied) with given change in St. But this makes the curves atter, therefore
the liquidity e¤ect (or e¤ect on the expected value of St), represented by the shifts of the
curves, may be o¤set.
5 Conclusion
Endogeneity problems impede the analysis on the e¤ectiveness of intervention. In most of
the cases, we had to estimate only a reduced form equation taking endogenous variables as
regressors, thus the results were obscure. The main motivation of this paper was to clarify
the interactions between interventions, market participantsbehavior, and the exchange rate.
The endogeneity problem can be solved by this clarication.
For the task, a system of equations was specied. Market participants were modeled
to solve utility maximization problems, and the central bank secretly intervenes to a¤ect
the exchange rate. But again, the central bank reacts to the exchange rate movements.
The model predicts that the interventions will be e¤ective, i) if the interventions inuence
the participantsconditional expectation in the desired direction (liquidity e¤ect), and ii) if
the interventions do not decrease the uncertainty perceived by the participants. We cannot
guarantee the e¢ cacy of the interventions if any of these two conditions fail.
To consistently estimate the equations, we should have valid IVs. Customer trades were
proposed as IVs, and the empirical results showed that the IVs were valid. In addition,
the model out-performed the random work model in out-of-sample prediction. More im-
portantly, the interventions of the Bank of Korea in the sample period were shown to have
insignicant e¤ects on the behavioral parameters but have the liquidity e¤ect. Therefore,
the e¤ectiveness was ensured by the conditions above. With estimated coe¢ cients, the sys-
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tem of equations was solved to generate a hypothetical exchange rate assuming that there
were no interventions. Compared with the actual rate, it was shown that the Bank of Ko-
rea intervened because the market was volatile, and that interventions indeed decreased the
volatility.
This nding has an important policy implication. That is, if one-sided large scale inter-
ventions are frequently exerted, the e¤ect of operations may be undermined by attening
the demand and supply curves for the foreign currency. Conversely, if operations can only
change the expected rate without altering the future variance, the interventions will be
e¤ective. This was the case of the Bank of Korea from 2001 to 2002.
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Fig.1. The Korean won and the Japanese yen rate in the sample period.
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Fig.2. The actual rate vs. the predicted rate
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics for the variables
Qt St JPYt ~CDt ~CSt
Mean 2,634 -0.184 0.009 835 862
Standard deviation 560 5.719 0.769 247 237
Skewness 0.233 0.171 -0.145 0.862 0.501
Kurtosis 2.959 4.364 4.102 4.320 3.202
ADF statistics -11.07 -22.50 -22.26 -14.88 -15.62
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 2.
CMLE result for the reaction function
N = 491
For BUYt, log likelihood : -5776.6, 2(2) = 347:29(0:000)
For SELLt, log likelihood: -5685.5, 2(2) = 329:22(0:000)
Coe¤. S.E. p-value Coe¤. S.E. p-value
D0 11.907 3.447 0.001 0 0.702 0.997 0.481
D1(BUYt 1) 0.641 0.035 0.000 1(Qt 1) -0.0005 0.0003 0.171
D2(St) -0.970 0.568 0.088 2(Qt 2) 0.0003 0.0003 0.365
D 71.943 2.296 0.000 3(Qt 3) 0.0001 0.0003 0.729
S0 10.105 2.869 0.000 4( ~CDt) 0.006 0.001 0.000
S1(SELLt 1) 0.631 0.035 0.000 5( ~CDt 1) -0.002 0.001 0.043
S2(St) -0.442 0.472 0.350 6( ~CSt) -0.007 0.001 0.000
S 59.765 1.907 0.000 7( ~CSt 1) 0.002 0.001 0.036
0 -3.322 0.341 0.000 8(BUYt 1) 0.004 0.002 0.036
1(jSt   Strendt j) positive - 0.000 9(SELLt 1) -0.006 0.003 0.035
2 -1.193 0.441 0.007 10(JPYt 1) 4.551 0.179 0.000
3(jSt   Strendt j) positive - 0.000 Z 4.252 0.096 0.000
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Table 3.
Estimation for Demand curve
Qt = D0 +
3X
k=1
DkQt k + D4C

Dt + D5C

Dt 1 + D6JPYt + D7St + "Dt
Excluded instrumental variables are ~CSt and ~CSt 1.
N = 491
F (8; 482) = 46:05
Probability > F = 0:000
Centered R2 = 0:198
Uncentered R2 = 0:965
Coe¢ cient Standard error p-value
D0 314.512 166.951 0.060
D1 0.418 0.058 0.000
D2 0.212 0.058 0.000
D3 0.161 0.055 0.003
D4 0.817 0.108 0.000
D5 -0.564 0.103 0.000
D6 388.668 116.096 0.001
D7 -79.289 23.735 0.001
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic(IV relevance): 30.501 (p-value: 0.000)
Sargans statistic: 1.795 (p-value: 0.180)
Pagan-Hall heteroskedasticity test statistic: 10.218 (p-value: 0.250)
Portmanteau Q statistic for eDt with lag 1: 3.462 (p-value: 0.063)
Lag 5: 4.673 (p-value: 0.457)
Lag 10: 8.763 (p-value: 0.555)
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Table 4.
Estimation for Supply curve
Qt = S0 +
3X
k=1
SkQt k + S4C

St + S5C

St 1 + S6JPYt + S7St + "St
Excluded instrumental variables are ~CDt and ~CDt 1.
N = 491
F (8; 482) = 43:85
Probability > F = 0:000
Centered R2 = 0:158
Uncentered R2 = 0:964
Coe¢ cient Standard error p-value
S0 229.842 173.574 0.185
S1 0.493 0.058 0.000
S2 0.156 0.056 0.006
S3 0.149 0.056 0.008
S4 0.978 0.121 0.000
S5 -0.614 0.115 0.000
S6 -327.386 116.595 0.005
S7 76.426 23.835 0.001
Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic(IV relevance): 28.595 (p-value: 0.000)
Sargans statistic: 3.230 (p-value: 0.072)
Pagan-Hall heteroskedasticity test statistic: 4.097 (p-value: 0.848)
Portmanteau Q statistic for eSt with lag 1: 0.943 (p-value: 0.332)
Lag 5: 3.105 (p-value: 0.684)
Lag 10: 8.462 (p-value: 0.584)
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Table 5.
Out-of-sample prediction of the model compared with a random walk model
A random walk model:
St = 1St 1+2Qt 1 + 3Qt 2 + 4Qt 3 + 4JPYt
+5C

Dt + 6C

Dt 1 + 7C

St + 8C

St 1 + et
The model A random walk model
Mean Absolute Error (average) 3.377 6.738
Mean Squared Error (average) 19.695 81.251
Table 6.
Result for the Chow test
H0: The coe¢ cient(s) is(are) same between the days with or without interventions.
Demand curve Supply curve
Variable Statistic p-value Variable Statistic p-value
Qt 1 -0.211 0.833 Qt 1 -0.044 0.965
Qt 2 0.011 0.992 Qt 2 0.160 0.873
Qt 3 0.267 0.789 Qt 3 -0.114 0.909
CDt -0.227 0.820 C

St 0.057 0.955
CDt 1 0.119 0.905 C

St 1 0.285 0.775
JPYt 0.053 0.958 JPYt -0.037 0.971
St -0.037 0.971 St 0.010 0.992
Table 7.
Sample variances of St in the hypothetical and the actual rate
Hypothetical rate Actual rate
Overall sample period 32.969 32.708
The days without interventions 25.792 25.756
the days with interventions 55.717 54.523
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